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Summery
The “Trinity Reform” in Japan has been carried out with different ideas by the Ministries, Local Bodies, and each local
government. Several contentions have been presented with regard to the reform and they are realized to converge in the
problem on general revenue. Though the official controversy of “the imbalance in the amounts between the Local Public
Finance Program and actual expenditures” in general revenue resources has not paid attention to the real fiscal
managements of local governments, the case studies in this paper indicates that local governments skillfully spend the
general revenue  resources to their prioritized public services and to infrastructure-related services such as deficit charge
and repair and maintenance that are not supported financially by the central government. 
Ⅰ. On the “Trinity Reform”
In Japan, the “Trinity Reform” which means that transfer of tax revenue sources from central to local governments,
reduction in central government subsidies tied to certain uses (categorical grants) and reform of local allocation tax
(general revenue resource) should be implemented at the same time has been differently interpreted by local
governments, the central governments and each ministry in it. While local governments have thought of it as the crucial
means for decentralization reform through which they would strengthen their substantially self-decisive power, the central
government as a whole has made efforts to decrease local budgets for the aim of fiscal restoration via the “Trinity Reform.”
The “Trinity Reform” has been certainly under the dissimilar objectives.
The objective for expanding self-decisive power of local governments prefers the simultaneous reform of tax transfer
to local governments, reduction in subsidies, and correction of fiscal imbalance among local governments by adjustment
function of local allocation tax through guaranteeing the cost burden of standard level as to public service at local level.
However, the objective for fiscal restoration requires not tax transfer but local autonomous taxation, just cutbacks in
amounts or ratios of subsidies, and restriction of fiscal guarantee function in local allocation tax.
The fiscal budget of 2004 illuminated this divergence. The government decreased the amounts of subsidies by 1.0
trillion yen, cut the local allocation tax by 2.9 trillion yen１）, and transferred tax resources by only 0.5 trillion yen. Totally,
the fiscal resource of local governments as a whole was diminished by 3.4 trillion yen, approximately 4% decrease from the
Local Public Finance Program of FY 2003. As a result, most of local governments faced the government-made fiscal
difficulties and took emergent measures like transferring fund money to general accounts. Some of them were forced to
compile a substantially deficit budget that was legally prohibited in principle. The dominant reason of their fiscal
difficulties is undoubtedly the drastic reduction in local allocation tax.
The local allied bodies such as the National Governors’ Association, the Japan Association for City Mayors, and the
National Association of Towns & Villages resisted such a disadvantageous trend of the “Trinity Reform” for them and drew
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up the reform plan of reduction in subsidy and other fiscal and administrative systems. Although the Cabinet stated to
respect their reform plan, the Ministries prepared for utterly different reform plans beneficial for them. The Ministry of
Finance insisted to shrink the local allocation tax as an established official agreement and fail to transfer tax resource in
exchange for cut in subsidies for infrastructure construction on the ground that they were financed through issuing
national bonds and no tax resource would be generated by cutting these subsidies. Such Ministries responsible for
infrastructure improvement as the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries seized this reasoning of the Ministry of Finance to avoid their subsidy cuts. The Ministry of Health, Labor
and the Welfare and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology tried to reduce the ratios of their
subsidies in order to keep their authorized powers through the subsidies in spite of reducing their amounts. The Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications, on the whole, struggled to ensure local fiscal revenues necessary for sustainable
fiscal operation in local governments. Through these official discussions, the government finally distributed the overall
plan “On the Trinity Reform” in November 2004. 
The major points of “On the Trinity Reform” are as follows. Firstly, the main subsidies subject to reduction were those
for the national health insurance and for compulsory education that were not listed or lowly ranked in the reform plan of
the local bodies. Besides, integration of separate subsidies and subsidy reductions without substitute fiscal resources were
adopted. Secondly, the amount of transfer of tax resources was interpreted to be 3 trillion yen including that amount of FY
2004. This means that total reduction in subsidies 4.5 trillion yen since FY 2003 in exchange for 3 trillion yen of tax
resources. Considering the reduction in 2.9 trillion yen of local allocation tax, local governments would lose 7.4 trillion yen
and get 3 trillion yen in turn. This calculation indicates that the central government’s aim to reduce local financial
resources for recovering national fiscal health will be contributed to a large extent by the “Trinity Reform.” Thirdly, the
amounts of local allocation tax would be sequentially decreased by lessening the fiscal estimation level of the Local Public
Finance Program, which shows the financial balance of local governments through computing the standard level of
revenues and expenditures by the central government.
In the fiscal budget of 2005 and the Local Public Finance Program for FY 2005, the sum of general revenue resources
(local tax, local allocation tax, and deficit bond) was made equal to that of FY 2004. However, a lot of local governments
certainly have to manage fiscal conditions with much further expenditures for social welfare, redemption of borrowings,
retirement allowance and so forth.
Ⅱ. The Crucial Point of the “Trinity Reform” Arguments: Local General Revenue
Although there seem to be several contentions on the “Trinity Reform”, they are converged to general revenue problem of
local governments. For instance, even if such subsidies as for compulsory education and life support are remained, it is
difficult to maintain these services without matching general revenue resources of local governments. Since the
concurrent implementation of reduction in subsidies and tax transfer from central to local governments is sure to expand
imbalanced fiscal powers among local governments, the function of local allocation tax should be expected to fill them so
as to keep equalized levels of local public services throughout Japanese society. It obviously depends on adequate and
stable local general revenues through local allocation tax whether or not the “Trinity Reform” will be successful for local
governments as a whole. As for the central government, however, the unchanged system of guaranteeing general revenue
resources by local allocation tax denotes a failure in fiscal restoration through a decrease in local expenditures. Explicitly,
general revenue issue is the crucial point in the “Trinity Reform” and was taken in advance in some official discussions.
The opening on this issue was made by private sector staff of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy through their
report “Toward the progress of the Trinity Reform” in August 2004, insisting that the scale of the Local Public Finance
－10－
Program and the amount of local allocation tax should be diminished. The Ministry of Finance also maintained to carry out
drastic reduction in local allocation tax in its report “On the urgent reform on the Local Public Finance Program” in
October 2004, contending to require (1) correcting and reducing improper “excess appropriation” (7-8 trillion yen)
through the Local Public Finance Plan in FY 2005 and FY 2006, (2) vanishing the shortage of local fiscal resources (7.8
trillion yen) in the Local Public Finance Program, and (3) reorganizing local finance system toward being not dependent
on local allocation tax.
The center of these arguments was the inappropriate “excess appropriation” in the Local Public Finance Program and
diverting of these fiscal resources to other services than the central government expected for local governments to
perform. The Ministry of Finance showed the samples of “excess appropriation” like non-subsidized capital expenditure
(“excess appropriation” greater than actual expenditure), salary of local public officials (its level in excess of those of the
central government and local private employees), transfers to local public enterprises (unreasonable fiscal burden in a
portion to be covered by fees or charges), and general administration expenditure (increase in the amounts without their
sound realities). In terms of the last point, the Ministry pointed out supports for individual assets (child seats in cars, raw
garbage disposal machines, and so forth), recreation-related expenditures (domestic and international travels), rewards
for marriage mediation, several kinds of celebration benefits (childbirth, school entrance and graduation, employment,
marriage, respect for the elderly and so forth), subsidies for medical expenses for the infant and child and the seriously
disabled. The Ministry regarded them as diverting general revenue resources to improper purposes. Moreover, the “warm
reception problems” of public officials in the City of Osaka, some of which certainly seemed impermissible to the public,
were widely paid attention to and criticized by both citizens and the central government, and turned much severer eyes on
the uses of general revenue resources by local governments.
On the “excess appropriation” problem, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications observed that since the
excess amount of capital expenditure is approximately equivalent to the shortage amount of current expenditure, the
claim that  the amount of capital expenditure in the Local Public Finance Program was simply too much was not
acceptable. The Ministry, in addition, suggested that these excess and shortage amounts were not huge in terms of general
revenue resources in reality because they included such specific revenue resources as local borrowings and subsidies
(Table 1). That is, though the Ministry also recognized the “imbalances in the amounts between the Local Public Finance
Program and actual expenditures,” it did not consider them as just improper “excess appropriation” and criticized the
decrease of local allocation tax on this ground. Besides, the local allied bodies have required the central government to
correct the imbalances for a few years.
These official discussions on this topic were not presented from the real managements of public finance in local
governments and failed to seize how they made actual use of general revenue resources in their regions. Hence, the
remainder of this paper mainly focuses on the analysis of this point.
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Table 1. The Imbalance between the Local Public Finance Program and the Actual Expenditure in FY 2002
(trillion yen)
Program Actual Expenditure Imbalance (general revenue)
Salary 24.5 25.9 1.4 –
General Administration Expenditure 20.0 26.9 6.9 2.9
Unsubsidized Capital Expenditure 15.6 10.6 △ 5.0 △ 2.6
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
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Ⅲ. “The imbalance in the amounts between the Local Public Finance Program and actual
expenditures” in general revenue resources 
In this section, the “excess appropriation” or “the imbalance in the amounts between the Local Public Finance Program
and actual expenditures” in general revenue resources is analyzed by examining the official data of some specific local
governments, considering that the managements or uses of general revenue resources are assumed to be varied according
to their scale and competence.
1. The Case of Small Local Governments
(1) Motoyama Town (Kochi Prefecture)
Motoyama Town is located in the mountain area of the center in Shikoku District and approximately 4 thousand people
live there. The dominant character of Motoyama’s administration has been to put high priority on local medical and welfare
policy. Motoyama has owned and managed its public hospital and performed its original welfare services for the elderly
such as the subsidies for caring them at home and for taxies and buses for welfare use. As for the fiscal aspect of
Motoyama, it is heavily dependent on local allocation tax from the central government as typical of small local
governments. The core of general revenue resources in FY 2003 is composed of local tax 310 million yen and local
allocation tax 1,920 million yen (1,530 million yen of regular allocation tax, 150 million yen of special allocation tax and 240
million yen of deficit bond).
“The imbalance in the amounts between the Local Public Finance Program and actual expenditures” in general
revenue resources is possible to be examined to a great extent by comparing the amounts of “Standard Financial Need”
(SFN) and actual general revenue expenditure, and the result of this analysis in the Motoyama case is shown in Figure 1.
There are mainly two characteristic points to be suggested. First, while SFN on capital expenditures in public works and
agriculture, forestry and fishery are much more excessive than their actual general revenue expenditures, much the same
amount of general revenue shortage is seen in debt charges. The prevailing view in the government is that the excess
amount of general revenue in capital expenditure is spent for general administrative expenditures including those
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Figure 1  The Imbalance in the Amounts of SFN and the Actual Expenditure of 
Motoyama (FY 2003) (thousand yen)
considered unsuitable as the Ministry of Finance and the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy exemplified. However,
this result indicates that the excess of general revenue in capital expenditures is spent for the repayment for previous
capital expenditures in monetary term. Second, current expenditures for such general public services as general
administration, welfare, and health & sanitation suffer from serious general revenue shortage. This implies that most of
public services in small local governments like Motoyama are poorly financed through the system of guaranteeing general
revenue resources via the Local Public Finance Program computed by the central government. 
For the detail analysis, specific expenditures in which the amount of actual expenditure exceeds SFN should be
broken down. As for social welfare & security, though the current expenditure for the elderly is well covered by SFN, other
current expenditures for child welfare and social welfare (excluding that for the elderly) are in serious shortage of general
revenue resources. One of the dominant factors is excessive fiscal burden for expenses in salaries of public officials
engaged in child day nursery. This fiscal burden is widespread over all the local governments in Japan. On the other hand,
the celebration benefit for childbirth which is criticized as inappropriate by the Ministry of Finance occupies just 0.2% (2.5
million yen) of the total general revenue expenditure for child welfare. As for health & sanitation, the hospital-related
current expenditure is the largest item in terms of general revenue in reflection of managing the public hospital, and the
environment-related current expenditure with general revenue resources is also huge in the form of the sanitation center
expenses. There is the subsidy for medical expenses for the infant and child in health & sanitation expenditure, but it
comprises only 1.3% (3.4 million yen) of general revenue in this item. 
It is summarized in the case of Motoyama that fiscal demands in welfare, medical, and environmental current
expenditures are not covered by SFN and it is hard to regard them as improper diverting of general revenue resources to
other purposes in general. On the contrary, it is reasonable to recognize that Motoyama makes ingenious use of general
revenue resources to develop local medical and welfare services corresponding to their priority.
(2) Achi Village (Nagano Prefecture)
Achi Village has approximately 6 thousand residents and is in the mountain near Iida city. Achi has laid stress on tourist
promotion with famous hot spring resort Hirugami area. In its master plan published in 2004, tourism-related industrial
promotion with organizational relations to other industries is placed in the center of local economic policy. Like Motoyama,
Achi heavily depends on transfer of financial resources from the central government and the ratio of local allocation tax in
total fiscal revenue takes up more than 50%. In its general revenue, local tax accounts for 640 million yen and local
allocation tax (including deficit bonds) 2,080 million yen in FY 2003.
The imbalance in the amounts of SFN and actual expenditures of Achi is shown in Figure 2, indicating the same sort
of characters as the Motoyama case. However it should be notable that the actual current expenditure in commerce &
industry is much larger than SFN for it. This is intensely related with industrial promotion policy of Achi. In this
expenditure, the general revenue resources are spent for a tourist association and other industrial-related works that are
supposed to be essential for tourist promotion policy. In short, Achi also spends the general revenue resources
corresponding to their policy priority set.
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2. The Case of City government (Sakai City)
As a case of city government on the imbalance situation in general revenue, the city of Sakai at Osaka is examined here.
Sakai is the old and second biggest city of Osaka with nearly 790 thousand citizens at the end of FY 2004. The
financial condition of Sakai has been recently deteriorated and so the ratio of local allocation tax in total revenue accounts
for more than 15%. The main general revenue in FY 2003 comprises local tax 114 billion yen and local allocation tax 42.2
billion yen. 
Figure 3 shows the imbalance in the amount between SFN and actual expenditures in Sakai. There are several
characteristic points described as follows. First, in capital expenditure for public works SFN is much more than actual
expenditure like the case of small local governments and this imbalance in the amount of public works exceeds the
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shortage amount of general revenue in debt charge to a great deal. Second, the current expenditure in public works suffers
from a serious shortfall of general revenue resources. This distinguishing feature is not seen in small government cases２）.
From the breakdown of this expenditure item, the shortage of general revenue is caused by the expenditures for sewerage
service, town planning & park, and road and bridge. The general revenue shortage in the current expenditure in public
works greatly exceeds the general revenue surplus in the capital expenditure of them. This reason is that the repair and
maintenance related costs and the transfer to debt charges for sewerage service suffer from scarce general revenue
resources. In this regard, it should be emphasized that the present estimation of SFN is by no means appropriate for the
fiscal demands of repair and maintenance necessary for constructed infrastructures, and the general revenue excess of
capital expenditure in public works also corresponds to that shortage of current expenditure in them like that in deficit
charges. In short, current expenditures in public works as well as deficit charges are assumed to be struggled in making
both ends meet within the general revenue funds of public works. Third, the enormous amount of general revenue
shortage is observed in the current expenditure of welfare. The breakdown of it indicates the major factors of the shortage
are connected to welfare expenditures for the disabled and children. Besides, with regard to current expenditure in
welfare for the elderly, Sakai faces the general revenue scarcity, too. In summary, big city governments like Sakai are
assumed to suffer from the current general revenue shortfall in general.
Ⅳ. Concluding Remarks
From the case analysis mentioned above, some overlooked or mistaken points on the issue of the “excess appropriation”
through the Local Public Finance Program are proposed. First, the important function of general revenue to enable “local
autonomy” in public administration is overlooked. As is typically observed in the case of small ones, local governments
perform administrative policies on their own initiative with general revenue resources. Welfare and medical
administrations in Motoyama and industrial administration in Achi are the examples and they are extremely hard to be
captured by the standardized computation and distribution of financial resources by the central government. By means of
skillful uses of general revenue resources in local governments, regional societies can be satisfied with proper sets of their
own pubic administrations. Second, on the contention of excessively guaranteeing general revenue resources for capital
expenditures, taking into account the shortage of them for current expenditures in debt charges and repair and
maintenance costs caused by improved infrastructures, they are presumed to be diverted to public works themselves as
well as other general administrative services. The official controversy in the government completely fails to notice this
point, although a recent great expansion of local capital expenditures was certainly led by the central government so that
it is supposed to be considerably responsible for these shortages. Third, while any type of local governments suffer from a
structural shortage of general revenue resources in current welfare expenditure, the shortages of them are suffered by
small local governments in health & sanitation expenditure and by city governments in current expenditure for public
works. These general revenue scarcities are insufficiently covered by SFN and no specific examination has been carried
out in the course of the discussion on “excess appropriation” problem. Fourth, as for the diverting of general revenue
resources to inappropriate purposes as the Ministry of Finance emphasizes, it is not deniable that this issue seems to be
remarkably exaggerated, considering the total amount of general revenue resources in local governments. In addition, it
should be deliberately judged whether such diverting purposes are sound or not in the light of administrative needs by
respective residents, since “general revenue” means that the freedom of local governments in carrying out their functions
with it is not impaired in principle.
Although the Local Public Finance Program is supposed to be indispensable for sustaining fiscal management and
public service supply by local governments, a drastic curtailment in its scale on the ground of the “imbalance” should be
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avoided. The primary way for the betterment of the Program is to correct the “imbalance” in both shortage and excess
items simultaneously through strict investigation in the realities of local governments by type. Since such local public
services as welfare, environment, and health are quite less adequate than public infrastructures, it is inevitable to divert
the fiscal funds on infrastructure to those general public services. The fiscal reform in this direction should be expanded
over the total characteristic of Japan’s public finance. The current “Trinity Reform” may be the touchstone of the entire
fiscal reform in the age of mature and sustainable society.
NOTES
１）In this paper, I include in local allocation tax the deficit bond “Rinji Zaisei Taisakusai” that has been introduced as a substitution for a
portion of local allocation tax since FY 2001.  
２）The same fiscal condition is seen in other big cities like Kyoto.
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